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ii.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JEROLDENE BAYLES, n.k.a.,
JEROLDENE BAILEY,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Petitioner,

Case No.: 980347-CA

vs.
RANDEE BAYLES,
Defendant/Appellant/
Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to this Court's Order,
dated July 30, 1998, allowing the interlocutory appeal. Rule 5, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in its determination that there was a
substantial change of circumstances allowing Defendant to relitigate a stipulated
property settlement, based on allegations of fraud, that Defendant was aware of
prior to the signing and entry of the parties' stipulation [R. 97].
Whether the movant established a substantial change in circumstances is a
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the

trial court. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Jeroldene Bayles, now known as Jeroldene Bailey, (hereinafter
"Jeroldene") was granted a divorce from the Defendant, Randee Bayles
(hereinafter "Randee"). The divorce was based on the parties' stipulation which
was incorporated into the final judgment.
Approximately four months after the final judgment was entered, Jeroldene
filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause in an attempt to enforce the stipulated
property settlement. Randee responded by filing a Petition for Modification
wherein he alleged that Jeroldene had secreted marital assets and that the
settlement should be offset by that amount. Jeroldene then filed a Motion to
Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Modification.
This appeal is from the trial court's Order, dated June 16, 1998, denying
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Modification. The trial
court was the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1. On January 27,1997, a Verified Divorce Complaint and Motion for
Order to Show Cause were filed.
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2. On February 3,1997, an Answer and Verified Counterclaim, Motion for
Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause were filed.
3. On February 6,1997, a hearing on the reciprocal show-cause motions
was held.
4. On February 13,1998, an Order Re: Reciprocal Orders to Show Cause
was filed.
5. On April 4,1997, Plaintiffs counsel, Rosalie Reilly, filed a Notice of
Withdrawal.
6. On May 2, 1997, a Motion to Bifurcate was filed.1
7. On May 7, 1997, a Motion in Re: Contempt and Affidavit of Plaintiff were
filed.
8. On May 9,1997, a Motion in Re: Contempt and Affidavit in Support of
Motion Re: Contempt were filed.
9. On May 13,1997, a hearing was held and a Decree of Divorce was
entered.
10. On June 13, 1997, the parties' Stipulation was filed.
11. On June 17, 1997, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
well as an Order In Re: Divorce Settlement were entered.
12. On September 29,1997, Defendant's counsel filed a Notice of

Douglas Terry, Esq. entered his first appearance on behalf of Jerodlene by way
of the Motion to Bifurcate.
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Withdrawal.
13. On October 24, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel, Rosalie Reilly, filed a Motion
for Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in Support of Motion.
14. On October 29, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel, Douglas Terry, filed a Notice
of Withdrawal.
15. On November 19, 1997, a Petition for Modification, Affidavit of Craig
C. Halls, Motion for Order to Show Cause and Affidavit of Defendant were filed.
16. On November 20, 1997, a hearing was held on the Order to Show
Cause at which time some issues were addressed and the hearing was continued
until December 23,1997 to address the remaining issues.
17. On December 11,1997, a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for
Modification was filed.
18. On January 2, 1998, a Response to Plaintiff Motion to Dismiss
Defendant's Petition for Modification was filed.
19. On February 9, 1998, a Notice to Submit was filed.
20. On February 11,1998, a Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss was filed.
21. On June 16,1998, an Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was
entered.
22. On June 30, 1998, a Notice of Filing Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order was filed.
23. On July 30, 1998, an Order granting the Petition for Permission for
4

Interlocutory Appeal was entered.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

The proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Divorce Complaint in this action was filed on January 27, 1997 and
Jeroldene's Motion to Bifurcate was filed on May 2, 1997 [R. 1, 24 ] Prior to the
hearing on the Motion to Bifurcate, Randee's counsel sent a letter to Jeroldene's
counsel, dated May 7,1997, which, among other things, set forth the allegation
that Jeroldene had secreted marital assets:
I would like to convey my client's concern with regard to
the Bayles Exploration accounts . . . It seem [sic] that
Randee paid thousands of dollars into the personal
account and Jeroldene made approximately $20,000, all
of the personal debts of the parties were paid out of the
Bayles Exploration account, including in early 1997,
double utility payments and double car payments. The
upshot of this is that the corporation has been drained of
assets, which we believe should be accounted for and
adjustment made in the settlement.
[R. 105].
The letter also made mention that while Randee did not have "all of the
necessary information with regard to the necessary adjustments . . . some of the
noteworthy items are" three thousand dollars ($3000.00) from the home safe;
double car and utility payments; seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) worth of
frozen beef; telephone charges for the months of February, March and April;
5

credit card purchases made on business funds, tax preparation costs; and liability
on 1996 corporate taxes [R. 105 ]. Finally, the letter also addressed the business
records, noting that discovery was being drafted and may be filed lo force the
return of those records to Randee [R. 105].
On June 13, 1997, a Stipulation, signed by ail of the'parties2, was filed and
the same was entered on June 17, 1997 [R. 41 ]. In fl 17 of the Stipulation,
Randee expressly waived issues raised and listed in the May 7, 1997-letter.
Defendant waives any claims against Plaintiff with
respect to those items listed in Defendant's attorney's
letter dated May 7, 1997, to wit:
(a) Three Thousand Dollars ($3000) cash kept in
safe in the home safe,
(b) Double payments on the car;
(c) Double utility payments;
(d) Frozen beef worth approximately $750;
(e) Telephone charges for February, March and
April, charged to Randee's card;
(f) Credit card charges involving personal items
which were paid from business funds;
(g) Cost of preparation of tax return;
(h) Liability for corporate taxes for 1996
[R. 45]
The parties' Stipulation was incorporated in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as well as the Order in Re: Divorce Settlement, both of which

2

Jeroldene signed the Stipulation on May 30, 1997 and her attorney signed on
May 28, 1997 Randee signed the Stipulation on May 10, 1997 and his attorney signed
on June 9, 1997 [R 47] The Findings and the Order that followed were approved as to
form and content, with changes, by Randee's attorney [R 55, 62]
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were signed by the trial court and entered on June 17,1998.
On October 24,1998, Jeroldene filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause to
enforce the property settlement [R. 64]. On November 19, 1997, Randee filed a
Petition for Modification3 in which he sought to, in effect, reopen the trial based on
allegations of misconduct prior to, and during the divorce proceedings. [R. 76].
Randee alleged that Geraldine failed to respond to his formal and informal
discovery requests regarding the parties' personal and financial records in
addition to Randee's alleged recent reconstruction of his financial records4 which
allegedly showed that Jeroldene took seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00)
out of the parties' business [R. 89 ]. In his affidavit, Randee alleged that
Jeroldene secreted money from the business in the months preceding the filing of
the divorce complaint [R. 91]. In addition, Randee also complained of the
property specifically waived in U 17 of the Stipulation (three thousand dollars
($3000) from the home safe, charges on the phone card and credit card, the cost
for preparation of the tax returns)[R. 92, 90, 90].
On December 11,1997, Jeroldene filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's

3

Randee also filed a reciprocal Motion for Order to Show Cause which requested
some of the same relief prayed for in Defendant's Petition for Modification.
"Although Randee claims that he was unable to reconstruct his financial records,
it is significant to note that on July 22, 1997, during the interlocutory period and after
the judgment had been entered, Randee subpoenaed Jeroldene's banking records. No
further action, however, was taken until September 9, 1997, at which time, counsel for
Randee withdrew.
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Petition for Modification to which Randee objected [R. 97, 117]. The matter was
submitted on February 9, 1998 [R. 127]. On February 11, 1998, the trial court
issued a written ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss and the Order was entered
on June 16th, 1998 [R. 129, 132].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Randee failed to show that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances since the entry of the judgment. Randee was aware of the
circumstances prior to the entry of the judgment. That he allegedly has more
details than he did prior to the entry of the judgment does not constitute a change
in circumstances, let alone a substantial change in circumstances.
Likewise, Randee's allegations about Jeroldene are not compelling and do
not justify the relitigation of the case. Assuming arguendo, the allegations
against Petitioner are true, Randee was, at the least, on notice of the alleged
misconduct and failed to diligently pursue his remedies. His actions should be
construed as a waiver of those issues and he should be barred from reopening
the case on the grounds of res judicata.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
EXISTS JUSTIFYING A MODIFICATION.

It is well established that a property settlement may be modified if the
movant demonstrates that there exists a substantial change in circumstances
since the time of the divorce. This is codified in Utah Code §30-3-5:
On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the

threshold requirement for relief is a showing of
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties
occurring since the entry of the divorce and not
contemplated in the divorce itself.
Various cases have addressed the burden for this showing, and have
consistently held that the showing is particularly high. See generally, Land v.
Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Adams v. Adams, 593 P2.d. 147 (Utah 1979).
That there should be a particularly high burden is embodied in the following:
Under Utah Law, a trial court sitting in a divorce matter
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such
modifications in the initial decree of divorce as it deems
just and equitable. Where no appeal is taken from the
original divorce decree, however, a change of
circumstances must be shown in order to justify a later
modification of such decree. Absent such a
requirement, a decree of divorce would be subject to ad
infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to
the concepts of equity held by succeeding trial judges.

Fouler v Fouler, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).
In the case at hand, Randee claims that the issues that he raised, but never
fully explored and/or pursued, are a sufficient showing of a change of
circumstances. The trial court agreed, however, the reasoning was problematic:
"[Ijogically it would seem that a difference between reality and apparent reality
does not constitute a change in circumstances, only a change in perception", but
the trial court then went on to add that if the difference between reality and
apparent reality was a change in perception, Randee would be bound to stringent
deadlines or a separate action. That Randee would be bound to stringent
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deadlines or a separate action adds nothing to the analysis of whether Randee
showed a substantial change of circumstances. Indeed, the trial court, in its
statement, implicitly acknowledges that there was not really a change in
circumstances, but then decides, presumably under equitable principles, that
Randee should, nevertheless, go forward.
Assuming that Randee's allegations were true, his claims could have only
been brought appropriately under a Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party...from a
final judgment...for...(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial...[or for] (3)fraud (whether
heretofore determined intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party..The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3
months after the judgment.
Randee's motion might conceivably have fit under subsections 1, 25 or 3,
but he did not bring such a motion and his Petition for Modification was not filed
until after the three-month deadline had expired.
In Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991),
this Court found that Rule 60(b)(1) -mistake, surprise, inadvertence or neglect-

5

Although the facts show that due diligence was not exercised prior to the
resolution of this matter.
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applied based on the Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered an ill-advised
stipulation. The Defendant, however, had not filed within the three-month time
period and attempted to set aside the judgment based on catch-all subsection of
Rule 60(b) -" any other reason justifying the relief from the operation of the
judgement". This section is not bound by a deadline. This Court held that since
subsection (1) was applicable, the catch-all subsection was inapplicable and
could not be used to overcome the failure to file within the three-month deadline.
Here, the trial court's ruling not only relieved Randee of his burden showing
a substantial change of circumstances but it also circumvents the deadline
otherwise imposed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Finally, if the issue of a change in circumstances was reviewed on the
basis as proposed by the trial court in this case, one could always find a reason
to modify a judgment. This is precisely what the Fouler Court cautioned against:
"ad infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to the concepts of
equity held by succeeding trial judges." Fouler, supra, 626 P.2d. at 414.
This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that the parties entered into
a stipulated settlement and when Jeroldene sought to enforce that settlement,
Randee responded by claiming that the case should be relitigated on the basis of
Jeroldene's alleged misconduct.
POINT II.

THERE ARE NO COMPELLING REASONS TO
RELITIGATE THE CASE.

In Despain v. Despair), 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme
11

Court addressed the issue of modification where there had been a stipulated
agreement incorporated into the judgment. In denying the request for
modification, the Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the
parties entered into a stipulation:
When a decree is based upon a property settlement
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the
court, equity must take such agreement into
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate rights
and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply
because one has come to regret the bargain made.
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of
the court where a property settlement agreement has
been incorporated into the decree, and the outright
abrogation of the provisions of such agreement is only
to be resorted to with great reluctance and compelling
reasons.
Id. 526, fn. 6.
Randee, at the very least, was on notice of the alleged missing assets as
addressed in his May 7,1997 letter. Even with this knowledge, Randee and his
attorney signed the stipulation. The signing of the stipulation also took place after
the threat was made that discovery was being drafted to compel the return of the
records allegedly held by Jeroldene. Randee held these same concerns at that
time and was aware of discovery methods by which more information could be
obtained. Yet, he put these concerns aside and entered into a stipulation. Thus,
there are no compelling reasons to reopen the case.
In Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court allowed
a property settlement to be relitigated solely on the basis that the husband had
12

engaged in active, extrinsic fraud. There, the husband had the wife quit claim her
interest in real property with the promise that he would pay her one-half of the
appraised value, something he had no intention of doing. The wife, relying on her
husband's representation, did not raise that issue in the divorce settlement. The
Utah Supreme Court reasoned that since the divorce settlement did not address
the property in dispute, the parties were not relitigating any issues.
This case stands in sharp contrast to Glover. There are absolutely no
allegations that Randee was coerced or misled about the "missing" assets before
he and/or his attorney signed the stipulation. Moreover, Randee, as his attorney
noted in the May 7,1997-letter, had the option of compelling the discovery.
Indeed, he indicated that the discovery was being drafted, but it was never
pursued. Thus, the issue should be considered waived.
In Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P 2d 1372, 1373-1374 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a property settlement based on a stipulation could
not be reopened and property redistributed based on the wife's claim that her exhusband had misrepresented the value of property that was acquired and
maintained during the marriage and that was ultimately awarded to the husband.
The Court simply refused to disturb a stipulated property settlement merely
because the wife relied on information given to her by her husband in an
adversarial proceeding.
Here, Randee, with knowledge, voluntarily contracted his claims away in
the divorce stipulation. The May 7, 1997 letter from Randee's counsel shows
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knowledge of this alleged secreting of funds. Randee had the option to, but failed
to use the discovery process. During the interlocutory period, Randee
subpoenaed Jeroldene's banking records, but never followed up on that
investigation. That Randee failed to diligently pursue the matter argues against
reopening the case.
There are no compelling reasons to relitigate this case and no change in
circumstances has occurred that would allow a modification of the decree.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the trial court's
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition to Modify be reversed.
DATED this 8th day of October, 1998.

UTAI^feGAL SERVICES, INC.
By /Rosalie Reilly
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Defendant's attorney, Craig C. HJaffs, aJK3^3 South Main, Blanding, UT
84511, this 8th day of October, 1998.
EGAK SERVICES, INC.
Rosalie Reilly
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